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ARTICLE
REGULATING IN THE LIGHT:
HARNESSING POLITICAL
ENTREPRENEURS’ ENERGY WITH
POST-CRISIS SUNLIGHT HEARINGS
JENNIFER TAUB*
INTRODUCTION
Financial market reform has progressed at a glacial pace. More than
six years after the 2008 crisis began, many of the conditions that caused the
near collapse of the global financial system—and that were used to justify
the extraordinary multi-trillion dollar U.S. government rescue1—persist.2
The top banks are larger than they were before the crisis began;3 are still
permitted to borrow excessively relative to the assets they hold;4 appear
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank Professor Wulf Kaal for
organizing and including me in the “Beyond Crisis-Driven Regulation – Initiatives for Sustainable
Financial Regulation” conference and the editors of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal,
particularly both Deborah Walker, for ensuring the event ran smoothly, and Adam Wickens and
his colleagues for their patience and careful editing.
1. Bill McGuire, Fed Loaned Banks Trillions in Bailout, Bloomberg Reports, ABCNEWS
.COM (Nov. 28, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/11/fed-gave-banks-trillions-in-
bailout-bloomberg-reports/; David Goldman, Follow the Money Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY
.COM, http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (figures current as of
November 16, 2009).
2. Jennifer Taub, Reforming the Banks for Good, DISSENT, Summer 2014, available at http:/
/www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reforming-the-banks-for-good.
3. Stephen Gandel, By Every Measure, the Big Banks are Bigger, FORTUNE (Sept. 13,
2013), http://fortune.com/2013/09/13/by-every-measure-the-big-banks-are-bigger/.
4. Leverage (the use of debt to purchase assets, which includes loans to customers and
securities, for example) is still quite high. Banks are permitted to borrow at levels considered
excessive pre-crisis (up to $97 for every $100 in assets they own). Experts decried the 33 to 1
(assets to equity) leverage ratios (meaning just percent equity capital). In April 2014, U.S. banking
regulators voted to limit borrowing at the top eight banks, those with more than $500 billion in
assets. Under the rules, these bank holding companies will be restricted from borrowing more than
$95 for every $100 in assets they own, and their depository institution subsidiaries would be
limited to $94. Yet these limits will not go into legal effect until at least January 1, 2018, and are
still far above safe levels. For example, Admati and Hellwig recommend a 20 to 30 percent lever-
age ratio. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES 182 (2012); Anat
Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Parade of the Bankers’ New Clothes Continues: 23 Flawed
Claims Debunked (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 143,
438
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exceptionally opaque to regulators, experts, counterparties, and even to
their own executives;5 and remain vulnerable to sudden, massive runs, due
to overdependence on the short-term wholesale funding markets.6
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act7
(Dodd-Frank) was signed into law in July 2010 to eradicate these problems.
The stated purposes of Dodd-Frank are: to “promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency,” to “end
‘too big to fail,’” to “protect American taxpayers by ending bailouts,” and
“to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”8 Unfortu-
nately, the promise of achieving these important goals remains unfulfilled
due to repeated efforts by dominant industry groups to delay, dilute, and
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2292229; Mayra Rodrı´-
guez Valladares, Why the Bank Leverage Ratio is Important, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 28,
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/why-the-bank-leverage-ratio-is-important/?_r=0;
Yalman Onaran, U.S. Banks’ Leverage Should Be Halved to Cut Risks, Bair Says, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-26/u-s-banks-leverage-should-be-
halved-to-cut-risks-bair-says.html.
5. Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s Banks?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/whats-inside-americas-banks/
309196/; Peter Eavis, Regulators Size up Wall Street, With Worry, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar.
12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/questions-are-asked-of-rot-in-banking-culture/
(William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said in 2013, “There is
evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large financial institutions;” and in a
2014 interview he said, “Either the firm is not too complex, you can manage it, you do know
what’s going on. Or, if you don’t know, that’s sort of raising the question whether the firm is too
complex to manage.”).
6. The collapses of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were precipitated by what Gary
Gorton dubbed a “run on repo”—when the institutions that had extended short-term and overnight
credit to the investment banks withdrew their financing. The continued reliance on this short-term,
wholesale funding creates what Fed Governor Dan Tarullo and others call “fire sale” risk. See,
e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., speech at the
Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference, Shadow Banking and
Systemic Risk Regulation (Nov. 22, 2013); Liz Capo McCormick, New York Fed Says Repo Fire
Sale Risks Not Being Addressed, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-02-13/new-york-fed-says-repo-fire-sales-risks-are-not-being-addressed.html; Jennifer Taub,
Time to Reduce Repo Run Risk, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 4, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2014/04/04/time-to-reduce-repo-run-risk/; Ryan Tracy, Fed Officials Suggest Limiting
Banks’ Repo Exposure: Rosengren and Dudley Say Large Markets for Repurchase Agreements
Could Cause Instability Again, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/fed-
official-suggests-limiting-banks-repo-exposure-1407936002. According to a report on “Conta-
gion,” reliance on short-term, wholesale funding means a bank is “more likely to suffer distress”
and “the best predictor of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk.” COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, WHAT TO DO ABOUT CONTAGION? 34–35 (Sept. 3, 2014), available at http://
capmktsreg.org/app/uploads/2014/09/2014-09-03-WDAC.pdf.
7. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365
(2012)).
8. The preamble to Dodd-Frank states its purposes: “To promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id.
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rollback reform.9 Most notably, the scourge of “too big to fail”10 and the
prospect of additional “taxpayer funded bailouts” have not gone away.11
In the summer of 2014, we were alerted that eleven of the largest
banks12 have failed to provide the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with credible “living wills”—plans
that detail how, if their institutions were on the verge of failure, they could
be restructured or sold (“resolved”).13 Dodd-Frank requires that these living
wills detail how the institutions can be “rapidly and orderly resolved in the
event of material financial distress or failure.”14 In a joint press release, the
Fed and FDIC wrote that common problems with the banks’ plans were that
they “fail to make, or even to identify, the kinds of changes in firm structure
9. Liaquat Ahmed, Timothy Geithner on Populism, Paul Ryan, and His Legacy, NEW RE-
PUBLIC (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/112152/timothy-geithners-exit-inter-
view (“It is true that there is an ongoing political effort to legislate a weakening Dodd-Frank or
block appointees. But that effort does not have much political force now.”); Joe Mont, Dodd-
Frank Act Still a Work in Progress, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Apr. 2014, available at http://www
.complianceweek.com/news/news-bulletin/four-years-on-plenty-of-dodd-frank-rulemaking-still-
awaits (“[E]fforts to kill the Act are now next to impossible . . .[t]here is still plenty of room,
however, to stall individual rules and amend existing ones. . . .”); Jennifer Taub, Delays, Dilu-
tions, and Delusions: Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, in RESTORING SHARED PROSPERITY: A
POLICY AGENDA FROM LEADING KEYNESIAN ECONOMISTS (Thomas I. Palley & Gustav A. Horn
eds., 2013); Jared Bennett, Four years after passage, House keeps trying to kill Dodd-Frank, CTR.
FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (July 21, 2014),  http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/07/21/15124/four-
years-after-passage-house-keeps-trying-kill-dodd-frank.
10. Several studies indicate that size matters; it confers upon the largest institutions a “too
big to fail” advantage, permitting them to borrow to fund their enterprises at lower cost than their
smaller competitors due to the perception that should they fail, a government-backed rescue would
be provided. And in late March of 2014, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York published a paper
that found that the five largest banks have a cost advantage relative to their smaller peers “consis-
tent with the hypothesis that investors believe the largest banks are ‘too big to fail.’” Joa˜o A.C.
Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too Big to Fail” Subsidy (Mar. 2, 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403441. This “too big to fail”
advantage meant that these banks borrow by issuing their own bonds at lower interest rates than
their smaller competitors.
11. Indeed, in a candid conversation with Harvard undergraduates, observed by a reporter,
former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner responded “Yeah, of course it does,” when asked
whether too big to fail still exists. He elaborated that attempting to eradicate it was “like Moby-
Dick for economists or regulators. It’s not just quixotic, it’s misguided.” Andrew Ross Sorkin,
What Timothy Geithner Really Thinks, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
05/11/magazine/what-timothy-geithner-really-thinks.html.
12. These eleven institutions are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Barclays,
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley,
State Street Corp., and UBS.
13. Sabrina R. Pellerin and John R. Walter, Orderly Liquidation Authority as an Alternative
to Bankruptcy, 98 ECON. QUARTERLY 1, 1–31 (2012), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/
publications/research/economic_quarterly/2012/q1/pdf/walter.pdf.
14. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d); Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Agencies Provide Feedback on Second Round Resolution Plans of ‘First-Wave’ Filers”
(Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140805a
.htm; Peter Eavis, Federal Reserve and F.D.I.C. Fault Big Banks’ ‘Living Wills’, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Aug. 5, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/federal-reserve-and-f-d-i-c-
fault-big-banks-living-wills/.
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and practices that would be necessary to enhance the prospects for orderly
resolution.”15 According to Vice Chairman of the FDIC, Thomas Hoenig,
“Each plan being discussed . . . is deficient and fails to convincingly
demonstrate how, in failure, any one of these firms could overcome obsta-
cles to entering bankruptcy without precipitating a financial crisis.”16
Credible resolution plans are legally required, and are necessary to
avoid contagion and help facilitate either a smooth bankruptcy or as a last
resort, an orderly resolution process overseen by the FDIC. The use of a
credible resolution plan in either scenario is intended to help allow a single
firm to fail without bringing down other large firms or the broader econ-
omy.17 The living wills that have been submitted each year have not yet
been deemed credible. Neither the Fed nor the FDIC has deployed the full
powers they possess under Dodd-Frank to mandate those banks to sell cer-
tain assets or operations.18
Unfortunately, even if credible plans are produced, if a “too big to fail”
firm were to be placed in the “orderly resolution” process (in lieu of a bank-
ruptcy filing), it would once again be the taxpayers19 who fund the process
at the outset.20 This is because though the House of Representatives’ ver-
sion of the legislation had required the banks to pay into an orderly resolu-
tion fund, due to intense lobbying, the law ultimately enacted has no such
fund. Instead, Dodd-Frank requires the U.S. Treasury to advance to the
FDIC the money needed to resolve a falling giant.21 And if proceeds of the
sale or liquidation of the failed firm are insufficient to pay back the obliga-
15. Joint Press Release, supra note 14.
16. Danielle Douglas, U.S. Regulators Reject Resolution Plans of 11 Big Banks, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-regulators-reject-
bankruptcy-plans-of-11-big-banks/2014/08/05/aec219b2-1ce3-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story
.html.
17. Ron J. Feldman, Forcing Financial Institution Change Through Credible Recovery/Reso-
lution Plans: An Alternative to Plan-Now/Implement-Later Living Wills, (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Econ. Policy Paper 10–2, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1608023 (“Ob-
servers hope the wills capture the advance planning needed for orderly resolution without bailouts.
This is wishful thinking unless recovery and resolution planning (1) leads to changes to financial
institutions and supervision in the here and now; (2) is driven by supervisors, not firms; and (3)
has transparent outcomes.”).
18. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(5)(B); Chris Matthews, Yellen Testimony Shows Too-Big-to-
Fail is Still a Very Big Problem, FORTUNE (July 15, 2014), available at http://fortune.com/tag/
elizabeth-warren/ (Senator Elizabeth Warren informed Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen that “There
are very effective tools that you have at your disposal if these plans aren’t credible. Including
forcing these financial institutions . . . to liquidate some of their assets.”).
19. Instead of banks funding the process, as was initially part of the House version of the
legislation, the line of credit provision was added.
20. Jennifer Taub, It’s Not a Bailout, It’s a Funeral, BASELINE SCENARIO (June 17, 2010),
http://baselinescenario.com/2010/06/17/it%E2%80%99s-not-a-bailout-it%E2%80%99s-a-funeral/.
21. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(n)(5)–(6); FDIC and Dept. of Treasury, 12 C.F.R. § 380 (2012)
(“In order for the FDIC to fulfill its obligations as receiver of a covered financial company, it may
be necessary for the FDIC to borrow funds from the Treasury.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Single Point
of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative 2 (Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Paper
No. 14–10, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408544
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tions owed to Treasury, the surviving banks can be required to pay an as-
sessment. But, by law, this repayment by the peer banks could occur five or
more years later.22 If history is a guide, particularly given the current ab-
sence of credible resolution plans, the messy collapse of one giant would
damage the other comparably-sized firms, and they would be in no position
to come up with the money to make up for the shortfalls anytime soon.
Moreover, scholars and economists have raised serious questions as to
whether the so-called “orderly resolution” regime can actually work well
with any of the colossal enterprises that operate across the globe.23
Meanwhile, efforts continue unabated to undermine the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau, the agency that has been quite successful in
meeting its deadlines24 and issuing rules to curb the predatory and abusive
lending practices that contributed to the crisis.25 Additionally, certain criti-
cal rules related to derivatives have been designed with large exemptions.26
These are invitations for industry to avoid compliance by maintaining and
growing some of the most dangerous practices outside our country, with
risk of loss still on U.S. corporate parents, and thus the U.S. taxpayers.27
We wonder how this came to be, whether the current state should
cause concern, and if so, what can be done to pick up the pace of reform
and block efforts to weaken the most effective provisions currently in the
law. Some answers to these questions can be found by examining and rec-
onciling two seemingly rival academic articles. These works are Roberta
Romano’s Regulating in the Dark28 and John C. Coffee, Jr.’s The Political
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated
(“FDIC would have access to large amounts of liquidity from the US Treasury as needed for the
holding company or subsidiaries.”).
22. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(o)(1)(B)–(C) (indicating that assessments are to be charged to
eligible financial institutions within 60 months “if such assessments are necessary to pay in full”
the obligations of the FDIC to Treasury. However, the FDIC “may, with the approval of the
[Treasury] Secretary, extend the time period . . . if the [FDIC] determines that an extension is
necessary to avoid a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United States.”).
23. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81
CIN. L. REV. (2013).
24. Elizabeth Warren, Speech before Better Markets and George Washington Law School’s
Center for Law, Economics, and Finance (Sept. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.war-
ren.senate.gov/files/documents/Better%20Markets%20Speech.pdf).
25. Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (written testimony of Adam
J. Levitin, Professor of Law at Geo. Univ. Law Ctr.); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind
Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1318, 1325 (2013).
26. Kara Stein, Commissioner, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Cross-Border Security-Based Swap
Rules and Guidance (June 25, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/
Detail/PublicStmt/1370542555426#.VAk53UuGpcM) (“Congress enacted derivatives reforms to
protect us from risks like the collapse of AIG. And it gave the Commission and the CFTC a lot of
tools to get that done. Today, the Commission is pretending we don’t have some of these tools so
that we can justify adopting this particular rule in this particular form.”).
27. Id.
28. Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 442,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148.
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and Systemic Risk Perpetuated.29 Both works focus on patterns in post-
crisis foundational legislation, coming to seemingly different conclusions.
However, upon closer examination, there is common ground to be found
and built upon.
This article will first explain the circumstances that draw these com-
peting works together. As part of this discussion, it will set out the distinct
claims each scholar makes about the nature and shortcomings of post-crisis
legislation, highlighting the areas of disagreement. This will focus upon
Romano’s recommendation that all post-crisis legislation and regulation au-
tomatically expire within five to six years, unless deliberately reenacted af-
ter a sunset hearing.
Next, the article reaches a synthesis, identifying the authors’ areas of
agreement and pointing to an alternative recommendation—post-crisis sun-
light hearings. Instead of an automatic sunset, sunlight hearings would al-
low something different. The foundational post-crisis legislation would stay
in place, but there would be an obligation to revisit it but with sufficient
temporal distance. These sunlight hearings would allow for technical ad-
justments, corrections for unintended impacts, and a public assessment of
the status of financial reform.
Instead of just independent experts as suggested by Romano,30 or only
top agency officials, sunlight hearings would bring to the table the same
political entrepreneurs who had in the immediate aftermath of the crisis
rallied allies to demand action. These individuals and groups would have
the historical knowledge of the legislation and related implementation, and
with the public interest in mind could identify gaps between what reform
promised and what it delivered. Similarly, industry representatives would
have their space to ask for relief. Their claims, like those offered by their
public interest counterparts, can be judged by the press and public in the
light of day, and not acceded to in backroom deals. This would help prevent
the pattern of incremental erosion of reforms that have of late followed
financial crises from the Savings & Loan debacle to the 2008 meltdown.
I. RIVAL WORKS IN DIALOGUE
Romano’s Regulating in the Dark and Coffee’s The Political Economy
of Dodd-Frank are logically paired given that the texts exist in dialogue,
each citing the other. Each scholar spends some time critiquing the argu-
ments the other makes regarding post-crisis reform legislation. Others
joined in on this conversation when it spilled off the pages and into the
blogosphere. This controversy ensued when Coffee and Romano were pan-
elists at an academic conference where Coffee presented his not-yet-pub-
29. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. R. 1019 (2012).
30. Romano suggests “independent experts.” Romano, supra note 28, at 20.
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lished paper.31 Though he had provided Romano with a copy prior to the
event, his more updated version that was circulated at the conference was
accused by some of including ad-hominem attacks on her and other corpo-
rate law scholars.32
Specifically, Coffee referred to Romano and two other academics as
“the ‘Tea Party Caucus’ of corporate and securities law professors” and
“conservative critics of securities regulation.”33 Some commentators
viewed Coffee’s comments as acceptable discourse, remembering that the
targets of his “name-calling” had previously engaged in similar practices,
albeit directed at regulatory efforts and legislation, not people.34 In the final
published version of Coffee’s article, a footnote offers an explanation for
his use of the “Tea Party” descriptor: “While there is irony in this term, it is
also intended to be accurate; the three occupy a polar position at one end of
the continuum in terms of their unbroken skepticism and rejection of gov-
ernmental regulation. At the same time, all three are original and creative
legal scholars.”35
Sweeping aside that dust-up, with admiration and respect for the analy-
sis and intentions of both professors, this essay explores how to synthesize
the insightful observations and cogent arguments that each piece presents.
This synthesis creates feasible, desirable, and sensible policy suggestions
that can fulfill past promises and create a safer and more equitable financial
system.
31. Cornell Law School hosted the “Financial Regulatory Reform in the Wake of Dodd-
Frank” Conference in New York City, Oct. 28, 2011, see http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/aca-
demics/clarke_business_law_institute/Conferences.cfm. Additional information available at http://
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/The-Dodd-Frank-Act-and-Regulatory-Reform.cfm.
32. Stephen Bainbridge, WTF is Jack Coffee’s Problem, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/12/wtf-is-jack-cof-
fees-problem.html; Larry Ribstein, Notes from the Tea Party Caucus of Corporate Academia,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 20, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/20/notes-from-the-
tea-party-caucus-of-corporate-academia/; Stephen Bainbridge, Civility in Context, PROFESSOR
BAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2011/12/civility-in-context.html (“Bodie also complains that we’ve all ‘Called a major piece of
federal legislation quack corporate governance.’ BFD. There’s a huge difference between uncivil
towards a person and being uncivil about a piece of legislation.”).
33. See Romano, supra note 28, at 42.
34. Matt Bodie, Name-Calling in Corporate Law Academia, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/12/name-calling-in-corporate-law-
academia.html; Brian Leiter, Coffee v. Bainbridge, Ribstein, & Romano, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW
SCHOOL REPORTS (Dec. 22, 2011), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2011/12/coffee-v-
bainbridge-ribstein-romano.html; Brian Leiter, Coffee v. Romano Redux, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW
SCHOOL REPORTS (Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2011/12/
coffee-v-romano-redux.html (Romano objected to the labels as “designed to delegitimize an argu-
ment by attacking the credibility of the speaker rather than the merits of the argument.”).
35. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1024 n.20.
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A. Regulating in the Dark
In Regulating in the Dark, Professor Romano makes three central
claims. First, she contends that “foundational financial legislation” is usu-
ally enacted during or in the wake of a crisis prior to policy makers having
sufficient understanding as to its causes.36 Second, she argues that finance
operates in a dynamic environment and thus legislation may have unin-
tended consequences as it is often poorly suited to address changes in tech-
nology and economic circumstances.37 Third, due to what she deems status
quo stickiness, she believes it can be difficult to revise legislation even
when the consensus is that change or corrections are desirable.38
According to Romano, the reason that post-crisis legislation is quickly
enacted is that crises are “focusing events” that make the public supportive
of a government response. This mood encourages “policy entrepreneurs” to
offer their pre-existing policy positions as solutions.39 Referring to the work
of political scientist John Kingdon, she argues that a sense of urgency to act
stems from “media clamor for action” to which “risk averse” legislators
respond hastily.40 As a result, she argues that “without an understanding of
the causes of a crisis, regulatory fixes, except by fortuity, are bound to be
off the mark.”41 As part of this rushed process, she writes that post-crisis
legislation thus “contains recycled proposals fashioned to resolve quite un-
related problems, imagined or real, which policy entrepreneurs advance as
ready-made solutions to immediate concerns, to a Congress in need of off-
the-shelf proposals that can be enacted quickly.”42
She also notes that rules enacted to implement a law can also be
rushed. Using Dodd-Frank as an example, Romano points to the delegation
by Congress to the agencies of approximately 400 rulemakings and 67 stud-
ies.43 While in theory it might seem ideal to hand over to those with greater
expertise the mechanics of implementation, in practice she observes the out-
36. Romano, supra note 28, at 1.
37. Id. at 1.  She further writes that “[r]egulations that are appropriate when initiated can
rapidly become inappropriate as a financial system’s business, legal and technological conditions
change.” Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. See generally JOHN KINGDON, AGENDA ALTERNATIVE AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.
2011).
41. Romano, supra note 28, at 5.
42. Id.
43. DAVIS POLK & WALDWELL, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010 (2010), www.davispolk.com/
sites/default/files/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Preview/Publication-
Attachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf
(conservatively estimating 243 rulemakings, and 67 studies). This was later updated in a subse-
quent progress report to approximately 398 rulemakings. See DAVIS POLK & WALDWELL, DODD-
FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
Nov2013_Dodd.Frank_.Progress.Report_0.pdf.
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comes in some cases44 could be as troubling. She contends, “delegation
enables legislators to ‘do something’ in a crisis, by passing ‘something’ and
thereby mollifying media and popular concerns, while at the same time
shifting responsibility to an agency for potential policy failures given the
paucity or poor quality of information available concerning a crisis’s causes
when the legislation is being crafted.”45 In the event the rules are effective,
though, “legislators could, of course, still take credit.”46
Because she seems to concede to the inevitability of this hurried ac-
tion, Romano offers several remedies for the problems associated with hast-
ily-enacted legislation and rushed rulemaking. She suggests that all post-
crisis legislation (1) would be embedded with a mandate that it be reviewed
and reconsidered at a future date47 by a review panel of “independent ex-
perts” appointed by Congress and the President48 and (2) would endow reg-
ulators with powers to grant exemptions and waivers. As a critical part of
the required review process, she envisions that all post-crisis legislation and
regulation would contain automatic sunset provisions.49 Such sunset provi-
sions would cause the statute (or regulation) to expire automatically on a
specific future date, as early as five or six years later.50 The only way to
avoid such expiration would be for the law to be reenacted in full or re-
vised.51 It is this threat of sunset, in her view, that would pressure those
involved to take the review process seriously.52 She observes:
[B]y the time of a statute’s sunset review, several years after enact-
ment, there should be a better understanding of the causes of the crisis that
the legislation sought to address, along with knowledge of the enacted leg-
islation’s consequences, information indispensable for getting regulation
right, but unavailable when a crisis necessitates a response.53
44. Romano does seem to commend the delegation to more expert regulators in some areas,
such as reducing systemic risks, including the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil and delegation and directives regarding leverage and capital ratios. See, e.g., Romano, supra
note 28, at 9. However, she later questions whether central bankers are actually “better positioned
to get things right.” Id. at 10. For example, she refers to the “favorable . . .  risk rates for residen-
tial mortgages” under the Basel Accord. Id. at 13. As noted by others as well, this encouraged
regulatory arbitrage and helped enable the securitization of high risk residential mortgages.
45. Id. at 7.
46.  Id.
47. Id. at 14.
48. Romano, supra note 28, at 20–21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id. at 14. In previous work, Romano advocated for automatic sunset provisions. See
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1600–01 (2005).
51. See Romano, supra note 28, at 20. It would be the task of the sunset review panel to
recommend action to Congress and on a specific timetable. She suggests these actions would be
either to repeal, reenact, or revise the law. Inaction, though, would result in the law’s automatic
sunset. Id.
52. Id. at 21. Based upon a discussion with Romano during the University of St. Thomas
Law Review conference in April 2014.
53. Romano, supra note 28, at 15.
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Let’s take each argument and then the proposed remedies in turn. Is
foundational post-crisis legislation typically enacted before Congress has an
opportunity to understand the causes? And, if so, what are the implications?
We can consider the enactment of Dodd-Frank in July 2010, three years
after the subprime mortgage crisis began and about two years after the fi-
nancial meltdown and bank bailouts began. It is true that the law was
passed and signed about six months before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) Report was published.54 The FCIC was a ten-member
panel of private citizens appointed by Congress to examine the causes of
the financial and economic crisis. And Dodd-Frank was passed about nine
months before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee Report was released.55
Both reports came to similar conclusions about the root and precipitating
causes of the crisis. However, hearings had been held long before the publi-
cations, including one by the FCIC beginning in January of 2010, in which
banking executives, regulators, industry participants, consumer advocates,
and other witnesses testified.56
Yet even if the particular nuances of the 2008 crisis were not fully
exposed, this is of no great matter.57 The basic causes of these and other
major financial crises were clear. It is widely accepted that banking crises
share common elements. This time was not different.58 Financial crises re-
54. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) published a 545-page book entitled The
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, which was in three parts. The first contained
the lengthy majority report endorsed by the six Democratic appointees. There were also two much
shorter dissents. On many issues related to the causes of the crisis nine of the ten panelists agreed.
All ten commissioners agreed that the proximate cause of the 2008 crisis was collapse of the U.S.
housing bubble. Nine agreed that risk management failures at banks and other financial firms led
to excess borrowing, particularly through short-term funding.
55. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH  CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF
A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (Comm. Print 2011), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/me-
dia/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2. In April 2011, the Senate subcom-
mittee issued a 639-page report called Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse. This report concluded “the [2008] crisis was not a natural disaster, but the
result of high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of
regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.”
Id. at 1.
56. See JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE
REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 269 (2014).
57. To this day there is still some disagreement as to the connection between the stock mar-
ket crash in October 1929 and the Great Depression. Even the causes of the sudden drop in the
stock market are still debated. Would the enactment of the first federal securities laws in 1933 and
1934 and the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act be considered hasty in retrospect? Many scholars,
though not all, contend that the New Deal reforms provided more than fifty years of relative
financial stability without a major crisis. Yet Roosevelt, who took office in March of 1933,
quickly ushered in these reforms within his first 100 days in office, when the full Pecora Commis-
sion report had not been released.
58. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4; ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION (2013); HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986); CAR-
MEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF
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sult from the collapse of debt-fueled asset bubbles. Banks that hold inflated
assets collapse when depositors or other lenders to the banks pull their cash
out. Even good assets cannot be sold at full price by banks scrambling to
come up with money. This spreads. Government rescues ensue when lead-
ers determine that the contagion associated with the failure of one banking
institution will cause widespread damage to the public.59 I would agree that
it has taken time to see how incremental legal acts and omissions over sev-
eral decades enabled the crisis.60 However, the essential crisis ingredients,
including excessive leverage and over-dependence on short-term wholesale
funding, were well-known and obvious.
In the recent crisis, the toxic assets included a wide variety of residen-
tial mortgage-linked securities. After a seven-year housing boom, when the
prices of houses nationwide stopped rising and retreated around mid-2006,
mortgage defaults followed. Banks that had borrowed excessively to
purchase these toxic assets, as well as the financial firms that insured
against these instruments, collapsed. This happened rather suddenly in the
cases of Bear Stearns and later the run on Lehman Brothers, where it was a
run by these investment banks’ short-term wholesale lenders that caused
their quick falls. This was no mystery by 2010 when Dodd-Frank was
passed. Much of this was openly discussed by witnesses as well as by finan-
cial economists, legal experts, journalists, and others well before Dodd-
Frank was enacted.61 Indeed, by July 21, 2010, there were already more
FINANCIAL FOLLY xxv (2009) (“No matter how different the latest financial frenzy or crisis always
appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past experiences from other countries and
from history.”); MARTIN H. WOLFSON, FINANCIAL CRISES: UNDERSTANDING THE POSTWAR U.S.
EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 1994) (surveying historical theories of financial crises to determine that all
involved the accumulation of debt); John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 2 (Cowles Found. for
Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 1715R, 2009), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
P/cd/d17a/d1715.pdf (“In the absence of intervention, leverage becomes too high in boom times
and too low in bad times. As a result, in boom times asset prices are too high, and in crisis times
they are too low. This is the leverage cycle.”).
59. This support can come in the form of the central bank, acting as a lender of last resort
offering liquidity (ideally at a “penalty” rate), and creating other programs to purchase toxic as-
sets. Other interventions, including direct capital infusion government can also be used to prop up
insolvent firms, as was done with the TARP. Still other support, such as during the New Deal era
can come from the ground up, through mortgage relief programs such as those offered through the
Home Owners Loan Corporation.
60. See TAUB, supra note 56, at 222–46.
61. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators Before the H. Comm. On Over-
sight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman
of the Fed. Reserve Bd.); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPEC. REP. ON REGULATORY
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-739, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION: FINANCIAL
CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
ACROSS SYSTEM (2009); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, COMMISSION HEARING OFFICIAL TRAN-
SCRIPT 18–115 (2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/
2010-0407-Transcript.pdf; FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (2010); ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? HOW TO FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 12 30-JUL-15 16:07
2014] REGULATING IN THE LIGHT 449
than 100 books published about the subprime mortgage crisis and the 2008
financial crisis.62 Moreover, well before the housing bubble burst in 2006,
experts were sounding the alarm about the pending collapse of the housing
bubble.63
Failure to expose all of the intricate details of the meltdown did not
inhibit Congress, the Fed, or the Treasury to collectively take unprece-
dented action to prop up financial firms and other enterprises, most dramati-
cally beginning in early 2008 and continuing well into 2009–2010. To
justify that multi-trillion dollar intervention, a list of causes was offered.
Central to all of those discussions were that certain banks and nonbank
financial firms had become “too big to fail.”64 They had grown so big and
fragile due to their excessive reliance on debt to fund their balance sheets.
And due to their interconnections (including lending to each other as well
as owning similar assets), the failure of one spread to another.65
(2010); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN
WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009); PAUL MC-
CULLEY, THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM AND HYMAN MINSKY’S ECONOMIC JOURNEY (2009),
available at http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2470/rf.v2009.n5.15; Gary B. Gorton & Andrew
Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 09-14, 2013);
Richard Bookstaber, Blowing up the Lab on Wall Street, TIME, Aug. 6, 2007, http://content.time
.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1653556,00.html; John Gapper, The Fatal Banker’s Fall, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccc6d456-8fd7-11dd-9890-0000779fd18c
.html#axzz3IcSidR4v; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Brooksley Born, The Cassandra of the Derivatives
Crisis, WASH. POST, May 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
05/25/AR2009052502108.html.
62. Gary Karz, Books Related to the Housing Crash and Financial Crisis, INVESTOR HOME,
http://investorhome.com/crisisbooks.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
63. MIKE MAYO, EXILE ON WALL STREET: ONE ANALYST’S FIGHT TO SAVE THE BIG BANKS
FROM THEMSELVES (2012); DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE RUN-UP
IN HOME PRICES: IS IT REAL OR IS IT ANOTHER BUBBLE? 2–5 (2002), available at http://www.cepr
.net/documents/publications/housing_2002_08.pdf; James K. Galbraith, Who are These Econo-
mists Anyway, THOUGHT & ACTION, Fall 2009, at 85; Jonathan R. Laing, The Bubble’s New
Home, BARRON’S, June 20, 2005, at 24, available at http://online.barrons.com/articles/
SB111905372884363176?tesla=y; David Leonhardt, Be Warned: Mr. Bubble’s Worried Again,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at 3.1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/business/
yourmoney/21real.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
64. See TAUB, supra note 56, at 87–90. As further evidence that this time was not different is
the fact that the expression “too big to fail” was used before in quite similar circumstances: in
1984 in connection with the bailout of Continental Illinois, as well as the soon-to-fail-and-to-be-
bailed holding company of the largest S&L, American Savings and Loan. Id.
65. See Tom Raum & Jeannine Aversa, Bush Asking for $700 Billion Bailout, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 21, 2008, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/20/bush-asking-for-
700-billi_n_127926.html (Treasury Secretary Paulson stated: “I am convinced that this bold ap-
proach will cost American families far less than the alternative—a continuing series of financial
institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund economic expansion . . . . The finan-
cial security of all Americans . . . depends on our ability to restore our financial institutions to a
sound footing.”); see also Bush: Bailout Plan Necessary to Deal with Crisis, CNN.COM, Sept. 25,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/24/bush.bailout/index.html?_s=PM (Advo-cating
for the TARP program, President George W. Bush said: “I’m a strong believer in free enterprise,
so my natural instinct is to oppose government intervention, [however] these are not normal cir-
cumstances. The market is not functioning properly. There has been a widespread loss of confi-
dence . . . . Without immediate action by Congress, America can slip into a major panic.”).
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One clear example of such justification was offered by then-Chairman
of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, in the summer of 2009. These causes were en-
twined with solutions. He told the audience at a televised forum:
The problem we have is that in a financial crisis if you let the big
firms collapse in a disorderly way, they’ll bring down the whole
system. When Lehman Brothers failed, the financial markets went
into anaphylactic shock basically, and it was that shock to the
financial system that led the global recession that began last fall,
which is probably the worst one since World War II. So it wasn’t
to help the big firms that we intervened. It was to stabilize the
financial system and protect the entire global economy.66
Bernanke continued in language more familiar to the crowd: “It’s a terrible
problem. It’s a problem called a too-big-to-fail problem. These companies
have turned out to be too big to allow to collapse because, again, if they
collapse the - when the elephant falls down, all the grass gets crushed as
well.”67
He then transitioned from the problem of “too big to fail” to describe
the solution—regulatory reform. The two essential components he de-
scribed, targeting both prevention and intervention, were ultimately at the
heart of Dodd-Frank. The prevention component was to subject the largest
so-called “too big to fail” institutions to oversight by the Fed, and to “put
extra tough requirements on their capital and their activities, what they can
do, the risks they can take,”68 which would later be referred to in Dodd-
Frank as “enhanced prudential standards.”69 The second component went to
intervention. He heralded the orderly resolution process described above as
an alternative to either a potentially chaotic bankruptcy or a government
bailout.70 Thus it was not a rush, but rather more than a year before these
form elements became the law. Moreover, as later described in this essay,
the so-called “tough” requirements have yet to arrive.
Even so, I do agree with Professor Romano’s observation that post-
crisis legislation is often misaligned. Furthermore, beginning with the S&L
Crisis response legislation (FIRREA), or even the accounting-scandal re-
sponse legislation (SOX), I see reform being repeatedly too timid to correct
the underlying problems, thus we face more severe relapses in the future.71
Romano is correct that some pre-existing items on reformers’ wish
lists were added to Dodd-Frank. However, this should not be considered a
66. Transcript of PBS NewsHour: At Forum, Bernanke Defends Fed’s Aggressive Moves
(PBS television broadcast July 26, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business-
july-dec09-bernanke_07-27/.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Dodd-Frank Act § 165.
70. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
71. See TAUB, supra note 56, at 1–6.
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problem, but a benefit of the Democratic process, something Coffee notes.72
It is also worth praising the reintroduction of possibly refined concepts that
have not before been enacted.73 Romano is correct that crises are “focus-
ing” moments;74 therefore, I believe that those prepared with helpful reform
concepts and drafted language should strike while the iron is hot. A policy
idea should not be rejected simply because proponents have not been suc-
cessful or there was not yet political will to act. Also, in light of Romano’s
observation that rushed legislation can be problematic, one would hope to
welcome that which has been debated and rethought over time.
That said, reformers are right to be concerned about Romano’s point.
Meaningful change can be stymied if a post-crisis bill is jammed with solu-
tions to different problems such that the bigger, necessary responses to the
current problem get crowded out. While problems or issues not directly
related to the crisis might get addressed, this could give the false appear-
ance of solving the pressing problems that led to the crisis. This could be
the case if trade-offs are made during the legislative process to reject
stronger reform measures and provide weaker substitutes, something that
appears to have happened in many instances with Dodd-Frank. Addition-
ally, as detail piles up, reformers’ limited attention can be divided and
hyperfocused on technical details, losing sight of the game-changing re-
forms that should lie at the heart of a post-crisis bill.
Let’s examine Romano’s second central claim—that finance operates
in a dynamic environment and thus post-crisis legislation may have unin-
tended consequences as it is often poorly suited to address changes in tech-
nology and economic circumstances.75 This argument appears to avoid the
fact that a post-crisis status quo can often be a post-government bailout
status quo. To postpone acting creates moral hazard and undermines the
public’s faith in the rule of law and in the markets. Also, assuming Romano
is right—that legislation and regulation can have unintended conse-
quences76—one can also argue that so can failure to act, deregulation and
desupervision, or uneven regulation. Her argument collapses on itself to
some degree, because it ignores the point that there is no blank slate pre-
crisis. Thus, the pre-crisis status quo must be the product of a prior legal
structure, which could be bad “bubble laws” and “quack” policies (borrow-
ing her descriptors). From a reformer’s perspective, this might also be re-
framed as any post-crisis reforms not going far enough to restore the
regulatory framework to what it had been before many years of erosion.
72. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1022, 1026.
73. As Coffee states, “The alternative view, here presented, agrees that crisis is a precipitant,
allowing legislative inertia to be overcome. After a crisis, Congress tends to adopt proposals long-
favored by the relevant administrative agency but frustrated by powerful lobbies.” Id. at 1036.
74. See Romano, supra note 28, at 4.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 1, 13.
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It seems accurate that law cannot anticipate technological or economic
changes. However, this is not unique to the financial sector. As for the final
claim regarding status quo stickiness, this does not seem strongly supported
by recent historical evidence. If anything, between 1980 and 2008, we saw
the incremental erosion of the structural reforms enacted during the New
Deal.77 Moreover, as Coffee notes, some of the most contentious or burden-
some parts of SOX were reduced through subsequent administrative and
legislative acts,78 arguably at a slow pace.79
We can now examine Professor Romano’s remedies. Even assuming
that each of her central claims is true, the mandatory sunset suggestion is
troublesome for several reasons. To begin, I believe if it were implemented,
the quality of post-crisis legislation would decline, not improve. If legisla-
tors knew ex ante that the laws they craft would sunset unless reenacted,
they may take less care. In the event that the entire bill was reenacted so as
to avoid the sunset, then we would still have the rushed legislation, but
possibly of even worse quality. If the entire law were to expire, then some
of those “prepackaged” changes that were at last ushered in with the energy
of reformers would suddenly vanish. The chances of seeing nuanced
changes that would serve the public interest seem unlikely given the tre-
mendous benefit the financial services sector could receive by just letting
the entire act expire and then getting incremental legal changes passed
where they wish to further their business goals.
Either way, the possibility that a law might expire in whole or in part
would create such uncertainty in the markets that it would seem unwork-
able.80 There is the added problem, which Coffee notes (as discussed be-
low), that reformers would be required to win their battles a second time.81
Given that the energy of political entrepreneurs will have faded by the five-
year-post-enactment automatic sunset, there is a chance that the whole law
would evaporate or, if revised, be substantially weakened.
77. See TAUB, supra note 56, at 222–46; see generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note
61.
78. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1027.
79. Romano, supra note 28, at 18 (noting it took eight years to reverse some provisions of
SOX).
80. She attempts to address this concern as follows, however, observations about the slow
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act show that business planning is not yet complete nor are the
rules.
First, there may be a prudential concern that a sunset law would impose costs on firms
and individuals by decreasing regulatory certainty, given an expiration date. I do not
find this to be a plausible explanation. In the financial regulation context, the multi-year
interval before a sunset is often long enough for the completion of business planning
surrounding the regulated financial investments and instruments, especially given how
rapidly the financial environment changes.
Id. at 23.
81. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1033 (“The ‘reform’ side would have to win twice, with the
latter battle coming after the crisis subsides.”).
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Supplementing the sunset provisions, Romano also advocates for al-
lowing regulators flexibility in the implementation of crisis-response legis-
lation.82 Such leeway would include the right to grant exemptions and
waivers. Certainly, delegating the implementation of rules to regulators
would allow for some flexibility, “at first glance” as she notes.83 Yet, in
practice, she noted that delegation creates business uncertainty, “a minefield
for business planning.”84  This claim undermines her earlier arguments that
the prospect of sudden sunset would not increase business uncertainty. As
for flexibility, regulators often already have the power to grant exemptions
and waivers. Of course, the problem with exemptions and waivers is that
they become a means to avoid adapting to changing technology or eco-
nomic circumstances in a way that benefits the public, and instead become a
way to grant special or powerful parts of the financial sector to gain advan-
tages and undermine the law over time so that it can eventually be repealed.
This is the reason that while flexibility is desirable, there needs to be greater
public awareness and input.
B. The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank
In his article The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, Professor
Coffee poses the question, “Why is it that Congress seems to only pass
securities and financial reform legislation after a crash or similar crisis?”85
To answer that question he makes three main claims. First, drawing upon
political science theory and building upon the work of Mancur Olson,86
Coffee explains that during normal times, latent “citizen-based” groups
(that are large and diffuse) are dominated by smaller and better-organized
special interest groups.87 Coffee observes that “[e]asily distracted by other
important issues, investors’ and shareholders’ attention span is short. In
contrast, the financial services industry is well organized, focuses on the
issues that most affect it, and has an obvious incentive to maintain a power-
ful lobbying presence that will give the industry disproportionate
influence.”88
82. Romano, supra note 28, at 3, 31.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1021. He also contends that historically, in the U.S and across
the globe, it has become clear that “only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and
regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive ‘reform’
legislation.” Id. at 1020. He also dates this tendency back to at least the time of the South Sea
Bubble approximately 300 years ago. Id.
86. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
87. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1021.
88. Id.
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Second, building on later theorists including Elinor Ostrom,89 Coffee
suggests that a cycle exists such that major crises interrupt this domination
allowing “political entrepreneurs” to organize the latent groups to shape
reform.90 These individuals and groups are successful at “exploiting the
popular discontent.”91 Responding to the crisis, “These entrepreneurs as-
sume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise latent interest groups in
order to secure election, or re-election, by assisting the public to overcome
entrenched business interests.”92 However, after the crisis, the hegemony of
the financial services industry is restored.93 He explains that this return to
dominance by the more powerful and focused special interest groups occurs
due to the fact that public attention wanes, and because the issues involved
are particularly complicated. Third, Coffee argues that both reform and der-
egulatory legislation contain flaws. However, he contends that the flaws of
reform legislation are often removed at the end of the cycle.94
Coffee echoes Romano in acknowledging that legislative responses
can be rushed. He observed that after the accounting scandals of the late
1990s and early 2000s, culminating in the collapse of Worldcom and Enron,
“Congress enacted, possibly in some haste, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX).”95 Like Romano,96 he notes that this, as well as the passage of
Dodd-Frank, was a reaction to popular demand or public outrage.97
Coffee asserts that his “[a]rticle is not a response to Professor Ro-
mano’s sunset proposal.”98 Instead, he sets out to respond “to the
worldview these scholars favor and an attempt to focus attention on the
critical implementation stage at which reform legislation is regularly frus-
trated.”99 Nevertheless, Coffee does briefly address Romano’s automatic
sunset suggestion. He contends that the proposal “ignores Mancur Olson’s
critical insight: in the long term, smaller, better-motivated interest groups
will likely dominate over the majority.”100 Thus, a consequence of a
mandatory sunset would be “to protect the hegemony of well-financed and
better-organized interest groups from majoritarian attack.”101 This is be-
89. See Elinor Ostrom, Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin Man-
agement (Sept. 29, 1964) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles)
available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3581/eostr001.pdf.
90. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1021–22.
91. Id. at 1022.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1023.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1020.
96. Romano, supra note 28, at 4 (discussion of “shifts in the national mood,” “media clamor
for action,” and “popular demand”).
97. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1021 (“Both of these episodes revealed abundant evidence of
financial chicanery and fraud that outraged and repulsed the public”).
98. Id. at 1025.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1023.
101. Id.
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cause “[f]inancial industry lobbyists could then easily organize to prevent
the reenactment of the original legislation once it reached its moment of
sunset.”102 This would put pressure on the reformers who would “have to
win twice, including after the crisis subsides.”103 Among the most signifi-
cant objections, Coffee observes that “to the extent that the recurring battle
over financial regulation is between those who want more regulation and
those who want less, a sunset remedy is inherently one-sided because it
applies only to legislation that imposes new regulation and not to legislation
that repeals existing regulation.”104
Let’s now address Coffee’s claims. Romano questions whether the la-
tent groups truly come into being after a crisis.105 She argues that “these
groups are full-time political players, and do not just spontaneously emerge
as a counterweight to business interests solely in a crisis, as Coffee would
have it.”106 In this respect, as applied to Dodd-Frank legislation and imple-
mentation, they both seem correct. After the financial crisis, a combination
of new groups appeared; some emerged, and others that already existed
became more organized and specialized in coalition around the particulars
of the recent problems. For example, groups like Americans for Financial
Reform (AFR) were new, but with a membership comprised of hundreds of
existing groups. Not a lobbying organization, AFR was “created in the
wake of the 2008 crisis” and is a “nonprofit coalition of more than 200 civil
rights, consumer, labor, business, investor, faith-based, and civic and com-
munity groups.”107 AFR’s effectiveness as a political entrepreneur was no-
ticed, including by Senator Elizabeth Warren who said, “Dodd-Frank would
have been a much weaker law if AFR had not been there.”108
Additionally, some groups were created afresh by individuals who had
never or rarely before been involved in legislative issues, financial or other-
wise. This includes groups like Occupy the SEC, created in late 2011 as an
offshoot of the Occupy movement launched in New York City.109 Members
of Occupy the SEC worked together to research, write, and submit an im-
pressive 325-page comment letter to the federal regulators regarding imple-
102. Id.
103. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1033.
104. Id.
105. Romano, supra note 28, at 17.
106. Id.
107. See About AFR, Americans for Financial Reform, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/about/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
108. As quoted on the AFR website, Warren additionally observed: “The AFR coalition
played a critical role in pushing for a strong and independent Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and, after the law was passed, in defending the Bureau against attack and helping it get
started on the right path.” Id.
109. Simon Johnson, An Occupy Wall Street Offshoot Has its Day, N.Y. Times Economix
Blog (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/occupy-the-s-e-
c-has-its-day/?_r=0.
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mentation of Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as “the
Volcker Rule.”110
Other new activists include individual academics111 who began to take
a more vocal role in policy than they had in the past, including actions like
testifying and participating in meetings with legislators and regulators.112
Another fledgling group is Better Markets, a nonprofit organization created
in 2010 by a private fund manager who was drawn to Washington for pol-
icy discussions and to offer testimony regarding the causes of the crisis.113
Better Markets is led by Dennis Kelleher and staffed by others who also
held top policy roles on Congressional staffs. As Kelleher describes, “For a
long time, there had been no organization dedicated solely to going to toe-
to-toe with the financial industry, on any issue, no matter how complex or
obscure . . . . That’s what we do.”114
The creation and continued existence of these groups show that Coffee
mildly, but not substantially, overstates a point about how the dominant
groups reassert their hegemony. He writes, “In short, those seeking to re-
duce systemic risk have few natural political allies; it is a cause that unites
largely the technocrats.”115 Today, both Better Markets and AFR continue
to work on systemic risk issues. While still outnumbered and outspent by
industry, they have access and growing influence.116
110. Nathaniel Popper, Regulators Weigh Massive Public Input on the ‘Volcker Rule,’ L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/15/business/la-fi-volcker-rule-201202
15.
111. As a volunteer myself for an AFR committee, I can concur that many others like me were
not repeat players, but became engaged after witnessing.
112. See, e.g., Staff Directory, Better Markets, https://www.bettermarkets.com/about/staff-di-
rectory#.VDVWtEuGpcM (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
113. Dinner conversation in September 2013 with Mike Masters; Testimony Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm. (statement of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member/Portfolio Manager,
Masters Capital Management, LLC) (2010), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-tes-
timony/2010-0630-Masters.pdf.; Testimony Before the Commodities  Futures Trading Comm.
(statement of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Man-
agement, LLC) (2009), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/hear-
ing080509_masters.pdf.; Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs
(statement of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Man-
agement, LLC)  (2008), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/052008Masters
.pdf?attempt=2.
114. Annie Lowrey, Facing Down the Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/05/31/business/kelleher-leads-a-nonprofit-better-markets-in-fight-for-stricter-
banking-rules.html?pagewanted=all (“Think of Better Markets as Occupy Wall Street’s suit-wear-
ing cousin.”).
115. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1032.
116. See Kim Krawiec, Don’t ‘Screw Joe’ the Plummer: The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013); Nathaniel Popper, Banks Step Up Spending on Lobbying to
Fight Proposed Stiffer Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
feb/16/business/la-fi-bank-lobbying16-2010feb16; Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-
Frank, THE NATION (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/174113/how-wall-street-
defanged-dodd-frank#.
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II. SYNTHESIS AND SOLUTION: POST-CRISIS SUNLIGHT HEARINGS
Both authors agree that post-crisis legislation is not perfect. In Cof-
fee’s words, he takes as a “common starting point” that “legislation is often
flawed” and that Dodd-Frank had “curious, overbroad, and inconsistent ele-
ments.”117 In Romano’s words, it is often “misguided”118 and “prone to
error.”119 Both recognize that it is public pressure (whether outrage or
clamor) that motivates legislators to act.120 In addition, both recognize that
regulating in the dark is undesirable and that having time to adjust flaws
after the fact would be beneficial.121 Both recognize that policy entrepre-
neurs or political entrepreneurs play a critical role in shaping post-crisis
legislation122 and that in time concerns about the crisis fade as attention
turns to other pressing issues.123 In light of these points of agreement, an
obvious solution seems in order.
Instead of a mandated sunset of post-crisis legislation with related sun-
set hearings, Congress should hold sunlight hearings. These sunlight hear-
ings would take place, perhaps, every five to six years after a major
financial crisis. If done right, we might not have another. The purpose of
the hearings would be to do an assessment of the legislative and regulatory
response to discern whether it is properly aligned to the problems that re-
main. Some of those may be crisis causes and others might be unintended
consequences of new business developments or of the laws and rules that
have been put into effect. The hearings could also examine gaps in
implementation.
Another purpose of sunlight hearings would be to harness reformers’
zeal that Coffee celebrates,124 but with sufficient temporal distance to pro-
vide a “clear-eyed assessment”125 that Romano promotes. These hearings
would be transparent and would help prevent (though perhaps not elimi-
nate) backroom deals. Who is at the table will matter. The legislation
should ensure a balanced representation of political entrepreneurs with in-
117. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1030. He also notes, “Rather than idealize this legislation . . .
[he] acknowledges that some of the Act’s reforms were flawed or even inconsistent. But legisla-
tion in the real world is always imperfect—this is the consequence of the logrolling and compro-
mise needed to assemble a majority in a divided political environment.” Id. at 1029.
118. Romano, supra note 28, at 1.
119. Id. at 2.
120. See supra notes 96–97.
121. Romano, supra note 28, at 18; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1026.
122. Romano, supra note 28, at 4; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1021–22.
123. Romano notes that at the time of a post-crisis sunset hearing, five or so years later,
“constituent concerns in a crisis that motivated the statute in the first place have drifted to new
matters.” Romano, supra note 28, at 19. To remedy this problem, she suggests that “evaluative
criteria for the sunset review, and not simply an expiration date, need to be specified in the statute
responding to the crisis.” Id.
124. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1022.
125. Romano, supra note 28, at 16.
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dustry members and experts.126 It is important to note that the hearings
would examine the unintended consequences, not just of regulation, but of
deregulation and regulatory failure. Sunlight can be more than a disinfec-
tant;127 it can generate the heat, or the political will, necessary to finish the
necessary work.
As a thought experiment, imagine if we held those sunlight hearings
today, four years after Dodd-Frank and more than six years after the $29
billion government bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008. The task would
be to shine a light on whether we think the reform legislation aligns with
the problems it set out to remedy and with its own purposes. We would look
not just to the stated purposes in Dodd-Frank, but also to the surrounding
public statements made by government officials to justify the bailouts and
to support the legislation.
A mandated post-crisis sunlight hearing would differ from the various
ongoing congressional hearings. These include regular appearances by the
Treasury Secretary (acting in his capacity as Chairman of the FSOC), or
other topically-related hearings organized by the Senate Banking Commit-
tee,128 or the House Financial Services Committee. The sunlight hearings
would be conducted at regular intervals to deal with some of the concerns
that both professors raised in their articles. First, the hearings would adjust
for what both agreed was a hallmark of post-crisis legislation—that it was
possibly rushed and contained flaws. Instead of throwing the baby out with
the bath water, such a hearing would allow us to take a look at progress.
Most centrally, we would examine whether the legislation has fulfilled its
stated purposes thus far.
The hearing would need to cover several days and be scheduled six
months in advance so as to attract enough attention and participation from
the latent groups and allow political entrepreneurs to become active again.
Importantly, equal representation of political entrepreneurs would be man-
dated, and former legislators and regulators would also have seats at the
table. Discussion would also cover any and all exemptions and delays. And
there would be a focus on efforts to rollback reform, so that reforms are
placed in context. This would compare to, for example, a recent Congres-
sional hearing the announcement of which focused on how consumers have
fewer choices, without acknowledging that some of the choices of the past
126. Additionally, Ross Levine and James Barth’s guardians of finance could be welcome
additions. See generally JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR., & ROSS LEVINE, THE GUARDIANS
OF FINANCE (2012).
127. See generally LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 89 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
1995).
128. See, e.g., Wall Street Reform: Assessing and Enhancing the Financial Regulatory System,
United States Senate Committee on Banking & Finance (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.bank-
ing.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=b15fc832-df18-
47d7-8c7d-1367e5770086.
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involved predatory loans whose terms made it difficult for lenders to repay
and helped foster a systemic crisis.129
These hearings would offer an opportunity for academics and activists
to share their empirical findings and for a report to be issued. Such a report
could reiterate or adjust key findings as to the cause of the crisis and in-
clude a checklist of unfinished business. Such a report could include online
access to exhibits and witness transcripts.
Because these hearings would be held regularly, every five or six years
post crisis, there would be the added benefit of keeping the crisis fresh in
the minds of the public and the next fresh young crop of economists who
might not have learned about it.130 It would also help in acting as a counter-
force against the efforts of well-organized industry groups to erode reform
piece-by-piece or gain particular advantages over competitors.131 Addition-
ally, mini hearings should be scheduled where political entrepreneurs can
also be present before acts of deregulation. This would help reduce the one-
sidedness that might result if attention is only drawn to reforms that restrict
bank activities as opposed to reforms that liberalize them.
Were these hearings held today, we might surprisingly learn how much
progress still needs to be made to achieve the fundamental goals of finan-
cial reform. This thought experiment of imagining holding sunlight hear-
ings in the future could also be used to apply them retroactively. As noted
in previous work, I see the most recent crisis not as a stand-alone event, but
as a continuation of the S&L debacle of the 1980s.132 If one looked back at
FIRREA, the reform legislation passed in 1989, one can see that it did not
fully address all of the issues that lead to the widespread thrift failures.133
One wonders how different the situation would be today had a hearing been
held every five years to make sure that the law lived up to its promises of
“never again” and that we were adapting regulation to meet innovation and
change. That would have meant hearings in 1994, 1999, and 2004.
Imagine if instead of being silenced, Brooksley Born could have par-
ticipated in such a post-S&L crisis sunlight hearing in 1999, along with
Professor Lynn Stout who was warning about the dangers of over-the-
129. Jennifer Taub, Now What?: Applying the Economic Dynamic Approach to Financial
Regulation, Concurring Opinions Blog (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2014/04/now-what-applying-the-economic-dynamic-approach-to-financial-reform.html
(Referencing U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services has scheduled a
hearing entitled, Who’s In Your Wallet: Examining How Washington Red Tape Impairs Economic
Freedom. Also discussing DAVID DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW (2013)).
130. See WOLFSON, supra note 58, at 3 (“Nearly an entire generation of economists was
trained without ever studying the origins and causes of financial crises.”).
131. It would help combat the forgetfulness and exuberance and fight against the trend of
how, as economist Hyman Minsky theorized, financial stability leads to instability.
132. See generally TAUB, supra note 56.
133. Id.
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counter derivatives.134 Perhaps seeing the 1993 bankruptcy of Orange
County as a potential source of larger future financial crises could have
been broached at a 1994 hearing. History might be different if in 2004,
instead of being ignored, economists like Dean Baker would have appeared
at such a post-S&L crisis hearing to talk about the growing housing bubble.
Imagine if in 2004, the hearing focused on avoiding another crisis and con-
sidered and avoided some of the changes to the bankruptcy code that would
be made via BAPCPA in 2005, which encouraged the extension of short-
term wholesale lending against CDOs and other risky assets. What would
have happened if consumer advocates were not just brushed aside by the
Fed Consumer Advisory Council after suggesting, as one did in 2004, that
her concerns that predatory lending was leading to a systemic crisis, but
instead testified before a committee where the public could watch? Can we
try to envision what a more contextualized discussion of the SEC’s net cap-
ital rule decision—allowing the largest broker-dealers to use alternative
methods for computing capital—would have yielded?
CONCLUSION
At the July 21, 2010, signing ceremony for the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, President Barack Obama
highlighted the statute’s goals. After detailing the important consumer pro-
tections contained in the law, including the creation of the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau, the President moved on to say:
[R]eform will also rein in the abuse and excess that nearly
brought down our financial system. It will finally bring trans-
parency to the kinds of complex and risky transactions that helped
trigger the financial crisis . . . And finally, because of this law, the
American people will never again be asked to foot the bill for
Wall Street’s mistakes. There will be no more tax-funded
bailouts—period. If a large financial institution should ever fail,
this reform gives us the ability to wind it down without endanger-
ing the broader economy. And there will be new rules to make
clear that no firm is somehow protected because it is “too big to
fail.”135
The President also recognized the need for dynamic regulation136 when he
offered this admonition: “For these new rules to be effective, regulators will
have to be vigilant. We may need to make adjustments along the way as our
134. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701 (1999).
135. President Barack Obama, Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act.
136. See generally Wulf Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, WAKE
FOREST L. REV. (2014); DRIESEN, supra note 129.
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financial system adapts to these new changes and changes around the
globe.”137
A year earlier, in 2009, Fed Chairman Bernanke justified the bailouts
that began under President George W. Bush and proposed a new regulatory
framework that would prevent this from happening again. He said, “These
companies have turned out to be too big to allow to collapse because, again,
if they collapse the - when the elephant falls down, all the grass gets
crushed as well.”138 Today, in the fall of 2014, more than six years after
those bailouts began, the elephants are larger than ever, the grass is still
crushed,139 and the regulatory framework is incomplete. The top banks are
larger than they were before the crisis and are more concentrated. Their
permitted leverage is at levels considered by experts to be too dangerous
before the crisis, and even rules to require the top banks to fund themselves
with more equity and less debt are insufficient and have not yet gone into
effect. The contagion that causes the failure of one firm to result in the
failure of many was transmitted through the short-term wholesale funding
system, upon which the system still too greatly depends. The perverse in-
centives that provide tremendous reward in the short-term for individuals
who gamble with taxpayer-backed insured deposits are profound, with indi-
vidual penalties and consequences practically non-existent.
While these conditions—size, leverage, and over-reliance on short-
term funding—persist, there are optimists who point to other key tools in
Dodd-Frank that arguably mitigate these problems. One such tool is the
mandate of orderly resolution plans—or living wills. Yet to date, the top
eleven firms have repeatedly failed to submit credible living wills. These
are to be used in either a bankruptcy proceeding or in an orderly resolution
by the FDIC of a failing firm. This was the mechanism designed to create
an alternative to either the chaotic Lehman Brothers bankruptcy process or
a government bailout. Critics of this resolution authority question it for a
variety of reasons. Some are skeptical as to whether it can work with firms
sprawling across the globe. Others wonder whether the FDIC has the ability
to manage a multi-faceted financial firm, as opposed to just a large deposi-
137. Obama, supra note 135.
138. PBS, supra note 66.
139. Between 2006 and 2013, about five million homes were lost to foreclosure with millions
more still in process. In 2013, nearly nine million homes remained underwater—approximately
one-fifth of all mortgaged properties. 9.3 Million U.S. Residential Properties Deeply Underwater
in December 2013, Down From 10.7 Million in September 2013, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/news-and-opinion/us-home-equity-and-underwater-report-de-
cember-2013-7959. Between 2009 and 2011, the net worth of the top 7% of Americans (about 8
million households) grew by 28%, while the net worth of the bottom 93% (about 111 million
households) declined by approximately 4%.  Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, A Rise in Wealth for the
Wealthy; Declines for the Lower 93%, PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 23, 3013), http://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2013/04/23/a-rise-in-wealth-for-the-wealthydeclines-for-the-lower-93/.
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tory institution.140 Even with a credible plan, a resolution, as enacted, will
be funded by the taxpayers until such date that the surviving banks are
assessed and pay us back. Yet today, especially when there are not even
credible plans submitted, when the top six banks are thirty-seven percent
larger than they were before the crisis, when they are still subject to firesale
risk and wholesale runs, it would be unwise to let Dodd-Frank sunset. There
are still plenty of measures in the statute of value that need support, not
erasure (such as the CFPB and the OFR). Moreover, it is time to shine a
light on the gaps between the promise of the past and today’s reality. Bran-
deis said that sunlight is the best disinfectant.141 But sunlight also brings
heat, and so do political entrepreneurs. We need to build mechanisms like
regular post-crisis sunlight hearings to harness that energy to secure finan-
cial stability and to end the boom and bust cycles at last.
140. In 2014, Bank of England’s deputy governor for financial stability “admitted [that] he
had no confidence a ‘global giant’ could fail safely and described TBTF as ‘perhaps the most
important regulatory priority.’” Banks Will Carry On ‘Too Big to Fail’, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17,
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/10704227/Banks-will-carry-on-being-
too-big-to-fail.html.
141. BRANDEIS, supra note 127, at 89.
